The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) is a well-known matching problem first introduced and solved by Gale and Shapley [7] . Several variants and extensions to this problem have since been investigated to cover a wider set of applications. Each time a new variant is considered, however, a new algorithm needs to be developed and implemented. As an alternative, in this paper we propose an encoding of the SMP using Answer Set Programming (ASP). Our encoding can easily be extended and adapted to the needs of specific applications. As an illustration we show how stable matchings can be found when individuals may designate unacceptable partners and ties between preferences are allowed. Subsequently, we show how our ASP based encoding naturally allows us to select specific stable matchings which are optimal according to a given criterion. Each time, we can rely on generic and efficient off-the-shelf answer set solvers to find (optimal) stable matchings.
Introduction
The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) is a matching problem first introduced and solved by Gale and Shapley [7] . Starting from (i) a set of n men and n women, (ii) for each man a ranking of the women as preferred partners, and (iii) for each woman a ranking of the men as preferred partners, the SMP searches for a set of n couples (marriages) such that there are no man and woman who are in different marriages but both prefer each other to their actual partners. Such a man and woman are called a blocking pair and a matching without blocking pairs forms a stable set of marriages. Due to its practical relevance, countless variants on the SMP have been investigated, making the problem assumptions more applicable to a wider range of applications, such as kidney-exchange [12] and the hospital-resident problem [18] . Recently Roth and Shapley won the Nobel Prize for Economics for their theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design, work that has directly resulted from an application of the SMP.
In the literature, typically each time a new variant on the SMP is considered, a new algorithm is developed (see e.g. [10, 13, 20] ). In this paper, we propose to use Answer Set Programming (ASP) as a general vehicle for modeling a large class of extensions and variations of the SMP. We show how an ASP encoding allows us to express in a natural way ties in the preferences of men and women, as well as unacceptability constraints (where certain people prefer to remain single over being coupled to undesirable partners). Furthermore, we illustrate how we can use our ASP encoding to find stable matchings that are optimal according to a certain criterion. Although the SMP has been widely investigated, and efficient approximation or exact algorithms are available for several of its variants (see e.g. [20] ), to the best of our knowledge, our encoding offers the first exact implementation to find sex-equal, minimum regret, egalitarian or maximum cardinality stable sets for SMP instances with unacceptability and ties.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give some background about the SMP and ASP. We introduce our encoding of the SMP with ASP and prove its correctness in the third section. In Section 4, we extend our encoding enabling it to find optimal stable sets. We explore several notions of optimality for stable matchings and show how optimal stable matchings can be found by solving the corresponding disjunctive ASP program. Finally we draw our conclusions.
Background 2.1 The Stable Marriage Problem
To solve the standard SMP, Gale and Shapley [7] constructed an iterative algorithm -known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, G-S algorithm or deferred-acceptance algorithm-to compute a particular solution of an SMP instance. The algorithm works as follows: in round 1 every man proposes to his first choice of all women. A woman, when being proposed, then rejects all men but her first choice among the subset of men who proposed to her. That first choice becomes her temporary husband. In the next rounds, all rejected men propose to their first choice of the subset of women by whom they were not rejected yet, regardless of whether this woman already has a temporary husband. Each woman, when being proposed, then rejects all men but her first choice among the subset of men who just proposed to her and her temporary mate. This process continues until all women have a husband. This point, when everyone has a partner, is always reached after a polynomial number of steps and the corresponding set of marriages is stable [7] . It should be noted, however, that only one of the potentially exponentially many stable matchings is found in this way. We formally define the SMP and introduce two variants that will be considered in this paper. We denote a set of men as M = {m 1 , . . . , m n } and a set of women W = {w 1 , . . . , w p }, with n = p for the classical SMP. A set of marriages is a set of man-woman pairs such that each man and each woman occurs in just one pair. 
Answer Set Programming
Answer Set Programming or ASP is a form of declarative programming [2] . Its transparence, elegance and ability to deal with Σ P 2 -complete problems make it an attractive method for solving combinatorial search and optimization problems. An ASP program is a finite collection of first-order rules
. . , C n predicates. The semantics are defined by the ground version of the program, consisting of all ground instantiations of the rules w.r.t. the constants that appear in it (see e.g. [2] for a good overview). This grounded program is a propositional ASP program. The building blocks of these programs are atoms, literals and rules. The most elementary are atoms, which are propositional variables that can be true or false. A literal is an atom or a negated atom. Beside strong negation, ASP uses a special kind of negation, namely negation-as-failure (naf), denoted with 'not'. For a literal a we call 'not a' the naf-literal associated with a. The extended literals consist of all literals and their associated naf-literals. A disjunctive rule has the following form
. . , c n are literals from a fixed set L, determined by a fixed set A of atoms. We call a 1 ∨ . . . ∨ a k the head of the rule while the set of extended literals b 1 , . . . , b m , not c 1 , . . ., not c n is called the body. The rule above intuitively encodes that a 1 , a 2 , . . . or a k is true when we have evidence that b 1 , . . . , b m are true and we have no evidence that at least one of c 1 , . . . , c n are true. When a rule has an empty body, we call it a fact ; when the head is empty, we speak of a constraint. A rule without occurrences of not is called a simple disjunctive rule. A simple disjunctive ASP program is a finite collection of simple disjunctive rules and similarly a disjunctive ASP program P is a finite collection of disjunctive rules. If each rule head consists of at most one literal, we speak of a normal ASP program.
We define an interpretation I of a disjunctive ASP program P as a subset of L. An interpretation I satisfies a simple disjunctive rule a 1 ∨. . .∨a k ← b 1 , . . . , b m when a 1 ∈ I∨. . .∨a k ∈ I or {b 1 , . . . , b m } ⊆ I. An interpretation which satisfies all rules of a simple disjunctive program is called a model of that program. An interpretation I is an answer set of a simple disjunctive program P iff it is a minimal model of P, i.e. no strict subset of I is a model of P [9] . The reduct P I of a disjunctive ASP program P w.r.t. an interpretation I is defined as the simple disjunctive ASP program
. . , not c n ) ∈ P, {c 1 , . . . , c n } ∩ I = ∅}. An interpretation I of a disjunctive ASP program P is an answer set of P iff I is an answer set of P I .
Example 3
Let P be the ASP program with the following 4 rules:
The last rule is grounded to 2 rules in which X is resp. replaced by john and by f iona. We check that the interpretation I = {man(john), woman(f iona), person(john), person(f iona)} is an answer set of the ground version of P by computing the reduct. The grounded rule with X = john is deleted since man(john) is in I. The reduct P I is:
The first 3 rules are facts, hence their heads will be in any answer set. The fourth rule encodes that any person who is not a man, is a woman or child. It is clear that I is a minimal model of this simple program, so I is an answer set of P. By replacing woman(f iona) by child(f iona) in I, another answer set is obtained.
To automatically compute the answer sets of the programs in this paper, we have used the ASP solver DLV 2 , due to its ability to handle predicates, disjunction and numeric values (with some built-in aggregate functions). The numeric values are only used for grounding.
Modeling the Stable Marriage Problem in ASP
In this section we model variations and generalizations of the SMP with ASP. A few proposals of using nonmonotonic reasoning for modeling the SMP have already been described in the literature. For instance in [19] a specific variant of the SMP is mentioned (in which boys each know a subset of a set of girls and want to be matched to a girl they know) and in [4] an abductive program is used to find a stable set of marriages in which two fixed persons are paired, with strict, complete preference lists. To the best of our knowledge, beyond a few specific examples, no comprehensive study has been made of using ASP or related paradigms in this context. In particular, the generality of our ASP framework for weakly stable sets of SMP instances with unacceptablity and/or ties is a significant advantage. The expression accept(m, w) denotes that a man m and a woman w accept each other as partners. The predicate manpropose(m, w) expresses that man m is willing to propose to woman w and analogously womanpropose(m, w) expresses that woman w is willing to propose to man m. Inspired by the Gale-Shapley algorithm, we look for an ASP formalisation to find the stable sets. 
and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ acceptable
and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, i ∈ acceptable
Intuitively (1) means that a man and woman accept each other as partners if they propose to each other. Due to (2), a man accepts himself as a partner (i.e. stays single) if no woman in his preference list is prepared to propose to him. Rule (4) states that a man proposes to a woman if he is not paired to a more or equally preferred woman. For j ∈ neutral i M the body of (4) contains not accept(m i , m i ). No explicite rules are stated about the number of persons someone can propose to or accept but Proposition 1 implies that this is unnecessary.
We illustrate the induced ASP program with an example.
Example 4
Consider the following instance (S M , S W ) of the SMP with unacceptability and ties. Let M = {m 1 , m 2 } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }. Furthermore:
The ASP program induced by this SMP instance is:
Notice that we use the facts man and woman to capture all the rules of the form (1) at once. If we run this program in DLV, we get three answer sets containing respectively:
These correspond to the three weakly stable set of marriages of this SMP instance, namely
Proposition 1
Let (S M , S W ) be an instance of the SMP with unacceptability and ties and let P be the corresponding ASP program. If I is an answer set of P, then a weakly stable matching for
Proof. Let (S M , S W ) and P be as described in the proposition. Because of the symmetry between the men and the women we restrict ourselves to the male case when possible. We prove this proposition in 4 steps.
1.
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, every j ∈ {1, . . . , p} and for every answer set I of P, it holds that accept(m i , w j ) ∈ I implies that j ∈ acceptable i M and i ∈ acceptable j W . This can be proved by contradiction. We will prove that for every man m i and every j ∈ unacceptable i M , accept(m i , w j ) is in no answer set I of the induced ASP program P. For accept(m i , w j ) to be in an answer set I, the reduct must contain some rule with this literal in the head and a true body. The only rule which can make this happen is the one of the form (1), implying that manpropose(m i , w j ) should be in I. But since j is not in acceptable i M there is no rule with manpropose(m i , w j ) in the head and so manpropose(m i , w j ) can never be in I.
2.
For every answer set I of P and every man m i , there exists at most one woman w j such that accept(m i , w j ) ∈ I. Similarly, for every woman w j there exists at most one man m i such that accept(m i , w j ) ∈ I. Moreover, if accept(m i , m i ) ∈ I then accept(m i , w j ) / ∈ I for any w j , and likewise when accept(w j , w j ) ∈ I then accept(m i , w j ) / ∈ I for any m i . This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose first that there is an answer set I of P that contains accept(m i , w j ) and accept(m i , w j ′ ) for some man m i and two different women w j and w j ′ . The first step implies that j and j ′ are elements of acceptable . The first two cases are symmetrical and can be handled analogously. The last case follows from the first case because it has stronger assumptions. We prove the first case and assume that man m i prefers woman w j to woman w j ′ . The rules (4) imply the presence of a rule manpropose(m i , w j ′ ) ← . . ., not accept(m i , w j ), . . . and this is the only rule which can make manpropose(m i , w j ′ ) true (the only rule with this literal in the head). However, since accept(m i , w j ) is also in the answer set, this rule has a false body so manpropose(m i , w j ′ ) can never be in I. Consequently accept(m i , w j ′ ) can never be in I since the only rule with this literal in the head is of the form (1) and this body can never be true, which leads to a contradiction. Secondly assume that accept(m i , w j ) and accept(m i , m i ) are both in an answer set I of P. Again step 1 implies that j ∈ acceptable i M . Because of the rules (2) P will contain the rule accept(m i , m i ) ← . . . , not accept(m i , w j ), . . .. An analogous reasoning as above implies that since accept(m i , w j ) is in the answer set I, accept(m i , m i ) can never be in I.
3. For every man m i , in every answer set I of P exactly one of the following conditions is satisfied :
(a) there exists a woman w j such that accept(m i , w j ) ∈ I,
and similarly for every woman w i . Suppose I is an arbitrary answer set of P and m i is an arbitrary man. We already know from step 2 that a man cannot be paired to a woman while being single, so both possibilities are disjoint. So suppose there is no woman w j such that accept(m i , w j ) is in I. P will contain the rule (2). Because of our assumptions and the definition of the reduct, this rule will be reduced to accept(m i , m i ) ←, and so accept(m i , m i ) will be in I.
4. For an arbitrary answer set I of P the previous steps imply that I produces a set of marriages without blocking individuals. Weak stability also demands the absence of blocking pairs. Suppose by contradiction that there is a blocking pair (m i , w j ), implying that there exist i = i ′ and j = j ′ such that accept(m i , w j ′ ) ∈ I and accept(m i ′ , w j ) ∈ I while w j < mi M w j ′ and m i < wj W m i ′ . The rules of the form (1), the only ones with the literals accept(m i , w j ′ ) and accept(m i ′ , w j ) in the head, imply that literals manpropose(m i , w j ′ ) and womanpropose(m i ′ , w j ) should be in I. But since w j < mi M w j ′ and because of the form of the rules (4) there are fewer conditions to be fulfilled for manpropose(m i , w j ) to be in I than for manpropose(m i , w j ′ ) to be in I. So manpropose(m i , w j ) should be in I as well. A similar reasoning implies that womanpropose(m i , w j ) should be in I. But now the rules of the form (1) imply that accept(m i , w j ) should be in I, contradicting step 2 since accept(m i , w j ′ ) and accept(m i ′ , w j ) are already in I.
Proposition 2
Let (S M , S W ) be an instance of the SMP with unacceptability and ties, and let P be the corresponding ASP program. If {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . ., (x k , y k )} is a weakly stable matching for (S M , S W ) then P has the following answer set I:
Suppose we have a stable set of marriages S = { (x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x k , y k )}, implying that every y i is an acceptable partner of x i and the other way around. The rules of the form (1) 
is the only literal of the form accept(m i , .) in I, so the rules of the form (4) will all be reduced to facts. The rule heads of these facts should be in the minimal model of the reduct and are indeed in I since the women w for which manpropose(m i , w) is in I are exactly those who are strictly preferred to staying single. The rules of the form (4) for women w j in neutral i M will all be deleted in this case, because accept(m i , m i ) is in I. If man m i is married to a certain woman w j in the stable set S then the rules of the form (4) will reduce to facts of the form manpropose(m i , w) ← for every woman w who is strictly preferred to w j and will be deleted for every other woman appearing in the head, because those rules will contain not accept(m i , w j ) in the body. Again I contains these facts by definition, as the minimal model of the reduct should. We can use an analogous reasoning for the women. So the presence of the literals of the form manpropose(., .), womanpropose(., .) and accept(., .) in I is required in the unique minimal model of the reduct w.r.t. I. We have proved that every literal in I should be the minimal model of the reduct and that every rule of the reduct is fulfilled by I, implying that I is an answer set of P.
In [18] it is shown that the decision problem 'is the pair (m, w) stable?' for a given SMP instance with unacceptablity and ties is an NP-complete problem, even in the absence of unacceptability. A pair (m, w) is stable if there exists a stable set that contains (m, w). It is straightforward to see that we can reformulate this decision problem as 'does there exist an answer set of the induced normal ASP program P which contains the literal accept(m, w)?' (i.e. brave reasoning), which is known to be an NP-complete problem [1] . So our model forms a suitable framework for these kind of decision problems concerning the SMP.
Selecting Preferred Stable Sets

Notions of Optimality of Stable Sets
When several stable matchings can be found for an instance of the SMP, some may be more interesting than others. The stable set found by the G-S algorithm is M-optimal [22] , i.e. every man likes this set at least as well as any other stable set. Exchanging the roles of men and women in the G-S algorithm yields a W-optimal stable set [7] , optimal from the point of view of the women.
While some applications may require us to favour either the men or the women, in others it makes more sense to treat both parties equally. To formalize some commonly considered notions of fairness and optimality w.r.t. the SMP, we define the cost c x (S) of a stable set S to an individual x, where c x (S) = k if x has been matched with his or her k th preferred partner. More precisely, for x = m i a man, we define c mi (S) = |{z : z < mi M y}| + 1 where y is the partner of x in S; for x = w j a woman, c x is defined analogously. So in case of ties we assign the same list position to equally preferred partners, as illustrated in Example 5.
Example 5
Let x = m 1 be a man with preference list σ 1 M = ({1}, {2, 3}, {4}) then w 1 as partner of x in some set of marriages S would yield c x (S) = 1, w 2 and w 3 yield c x (S) = 2 and w 4 yields c x (S) = 4. If m 1 would be single in S, then the cost c x (S) is 4, since m 1 prefers women w 1 , w 2 and w 3 to being single, but is indifferent between being paired to w 4 or staying single.
Definition 5
For S a set of marriages,
• the sex-equalness cost is defined as c sexeq (S) = | x∈M c x (S) − x∈W c x (S)|,
• the egalitarian cost is defined as c weight (S) = x∈M∪W c x (S),
• the regret cost is defined as c regret (S) = max x∈M∪W c x (S), and
• the cardinality cost is defined as c singles (S) = |{z : (z, z) ∈ S}|.
S is a sex-equal stable set iff S is a stable set with minimal sex-equalness cost. Similarly, S is an egalitarian (resp. minmum regret, maximum cardinality) stable set iff S is a stable set with minimal egalitarian (resp. regret or cardinality) cost.
A sex-equal stable set assigns an equal importance to the preferences of the men and women. An egalitarian stable set is a stable set in which the preferences of every individual are considered to be equally important. In [23] the use of an egalitarian stable set is proposed to optimally match virtual machines (VM) to servers in order to improve cloud computing by equalizing the importance of migration overhead in the data center network and VM migration performance. A minimum regret stable set is optimal for the person who is worst off. A maximal or minimal cardinality stable set is a stable set with resp. as few or as many singles as possible. Examples of practical applications include an efficient kidney exchange program [21] and the National Resident Matching Program 3 [18] . Maximizing cardinality garantuees that as many donors as possible will get a compatible donor and as many medical graduates as possible will get a position. Table 1 presents an overview of known complexity results 4 concerning finding an optimal stable set. Typically the presence of ties leads to an increase of complexity. Manlove et al. [17, 18] proved that the problem of finding a maximum (or minimum) cardinality stable set for a given instance of the SMP with unacceptability and ties is NP-hard. Using this result, the problem of finding an egalitarian or minimum regret stable matching for a given SMP instance with ties is proved to be NP-hard [18] , even if the ties occur on one side only and each tie is of length 2 (i.e. each set in a preference list has size at most 2). If there are no ties, the problem of finding an egalitarian or minimum regret stable set is solvable in polynomial time [13, 10] . Since all stable sets consist of n couples in the classical SMP, the G-S algorithm trivially finds a maximum (or minimum) cardinality [7] . For an SMP instance with unacceptability the number of couples in a stable set is constant [8] , so finding a maximum cardinality stable set reduces to finding a stable set, which is known to be solvable in polynomial time. Surprisingly, finding a sex-equal stable set for a classical SMP instance is NP-hard [16] , even if the preference lists are bound in length by 3 [20] . Between brackets we mention in Table 1 the complexity of an algorithm that finds an optimal stable set if one exists, in function of the number of men n. To the best of our knowledge, the only exact algorithm tackling an NP-hard problem from Table 1 finds a sex-equal stable set for an SMP instance in which the strict preference lists of men and/or women are bounded in length by a constant [20] . To the best of our knowledge, no exact implementations exist to find an optimal stable set for an SMP instance with ties, regardless of the presence of unacceptability and regardless which notion of optimality from Table 1 is used. Our approach yields an exact implementation of all problems mentioned in Table 1 .
Finding Optimal Stable Sets using Disjunctive ASP
As we discuss next, we can extend our ASP encoding of the SMP such that the optimal stable sets correspond to the answer sets of an associated ASP program. In particular, we use a saturation technique [5, 1] to filter non-optimal answer sets. Intuitively, the idea is to create a program with 3 components: (i) a first part describing the solution candidates, (ii) a second part also describing the solution candidates since comparison of solutions requires multiple solution candidates within the same answer set whereas the first part in itself produces one solution per answer set, (iii) a third part comparing the solutions described in the first two parts and selecting the preferred solutions by saturation. It is known that the presence of negation-as-failure can cause problems when applying saturation. Therefore, we use a SAT encoding [15] of the ASP program in Definition 4 and define a disjunctive naf-free ASP program in Definition 6 which selects particular models of the SAT problem. Notice that our original normal program is absolutely tight, i.e. there is no finite sequence l 1 , l 2 , . . . of literals such that for every i there is a program rule for which l i+1 is a positive body literal and l i is in the head [6] . We use the completion and a translation of our ASP program to SAT to derive Definition 6. The completion of a normal ASP program is a set of propositional formulas. For every atom a with a ← body i (i ∈ {1, . . . , k}) all the program rules with head a, the propositional formula a ≡ body i is the conjunction of literals derived from body i by replacing every occurence of 'not' with '¬'. Because our program is absolutely tight, we know that the completion will correspond to it [6] . Applied to the induced normal ASP program in Definition 4, the completion becomes:
Using the formulas of the completion corresponding to the normal ASP program in Definition 4, we can define a corresponding disjunctive ASP program without negation-as-failure. Lemma 3 follows form the fact that the completion corresponds to the original program [6] .
Definition 6 (Induced disj. naf-free ASP program)
The disjunctive naf-free ASP program P disj induced by an SMP instance (S M , S W ) with unacceptability and ties contains the following rules for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}:
and symmetrical for j ∈ {1, . . . , p} and womanpropose.
Lemma 3
Let P be the normal ASP program from Definition 4 and P disj the disjunctive ASP program from Definition 6. It holds that for any answer set I of P there exists an answer set I disj of P disj such that the atoms of I and I disj coincide. Conversely for any answer set I disj of P disj there exists an answer set I of P such that the atoms of I and I disj coincide.
ASP Program to Select Optimal Solutions
Let (S M , S W ) be an SMP instance with unacceptability and ties, with
. . , σ p W }, and let P norm be the induced normal ASP program from Definition 4. Our technique for extending this program to a program that can respectively optimize for the sex-equalness, egalitarian, minimum regret and maximum cardinality criterion is in each case very similar. We start by explaining it for the case of sex-equalness. Our first step is to add a set of rules that compute the sex-equalness cost of a set of marriages. For every man m i and every woman w j such that j ∈ σ i M (k) we use the following rule to determine the cost for m i if w j would be his partner:
and similarly for every w j and every
We also use the following rules with i ranging from 1 to n and j from 1 to p:
Rules (8) and (9) state staying single leads to the highest cost. Rule (10) determines the sum of the male costs 5 and similarly (11) determines the sum of the female costs. According to Definition 5 the absolute difference of these values yields the sex-equalness cost, as determined by rules (12) . Since numeric variables are restricted to positive integers in DLV, we omit conditions as 'X ≥ Y ' or 'X < Y '. The program P norm extended with rules (6) - (12) sat ← atom, natom
Finally add rules (6) - (12) with prime symbols to the literal names to P ′sexeq ext but replace rule (10) and rule (11) 
The DLV aggregate function #succ(J, I) is true whenever J + 1 = I. The reason we replace the rules with the aggregate function #max by these rules is to make sure the saturation happens correct. When saturation is used, the DLV aggregate function #max, #sum and #count would not yield the right criteriumvalues. Moreover, DLV does not accept these aggregate function in saturation because of the cyclic dependency of literals within the aggragate functions created by the rules for saturation. These adjusted rules, however, will do the job because of the successive way they compute the criteriumvalues. This becomes more clear in the proof of Proposition 4. We define the ASP program P sexeq as the union of P sexeq ext , P ′sexeq ext and P sat . The ASP program P sat contains the following rules to select minimal solutions based on sex-equalness:
and analogous to (18) a set of rules with prefix 'n' for the head predicates. Finally we add the facts
← for every man x and woman(x) ← for every woman x to P sat . Intuitively the rules of P sat express the key idea of saturation. First every answer set is forced to contain the atom sat by rule (16) . Then the rules (17) - (18) and the facts make sure that any answer set should contain all possible literals with a prime symbol that occur in P sexeq . Rule (15) will establish that only optimal solutions will correspond to minimal models and thus lead to answer sets. For any non-optimal solution, the corresponding interpretation containing sat will never be a minimal model of the reduct. It is formally proved in Proposition 4 below that P sexeq produces exactly the stable matchings with minimal sex-equalness cost.
Furthermore, only small adjustments to P sexeq are needed to create programs P weight , P regret , and P singles that resp. produce egalitarian, minimum regret and maximum cardinality stable sets. Indeed, the ASP program P weight can easily be defined as P sexeq in which the predicates sexeq and sexeq ′ are resp. replaced by weight and weight ′ and the rules (12) are replaced by (19) , determining the egalitarian cost of Definition 5 as the sum of the male and female costs:
Similarly the ASP program P regret is defined as P sexeq in which the predicates sexeq and sexeq ′ are resp. replaced by regret and regret ′ and rules (10) - (12) are replaced by the following rules:
Rule (20) determines the regret cost but only for the men. Similarly (21) determines the regret cost for the women. The regret cost as defined in Definition 5 is the maximum of these two values, determined by the rules in (22) . Again we adjust rules (20) and (21) for the program part P ′regret ext by replacing them with a successively computing variant:
Finally we define the ASP program P singles as P sexeq in which the predicates sexeq and sexeq ′ are resp. replaced by singles and singles ′ . Furthermore we replace rules (6) - (12) by (24), determining the number of singles:
This time we adjust rule (24) for the program part P ′singles ext as follows:
Example 6
We reconsider Example 4. This SMP instance had 3 stable sets of marriages:
• S 2 = {accept(m 1 , w 2 ), accept(m 2 , w 1 ), accept(w 3 , w 3 )},
It is easy to compute the respective regret costs as c regret (S 1 ) = 2 and c regret (S 2 ) = c regret (S 3 ) = 3. The corresponding program selecting this minimum regret stable set is the program consisting of the rules in Example 4 in addition with: If we delete from P sexeq the rules (11) - (12) and replace rule (15) by the rule sat ← manweight(X), manweight ′ (Y ), X ≤ Y , then we obtain the M-optimal stable sets. Analogously we can obtain the W-optimal stable sets.
If a criterion is to be maximized, the symbol ≤ in rule (15) is simply replaced by ≥. E.g. for crit = singles we will get minimum cardinality stable sets.
Complexity and Future Work
The NP-complete decision problem 'does there exist a stable set with cardinality ≥ k (resp. ≤ k) for an SMP instance with unacceptability and ties with k a positive integer?' [17, 18] has practical importance, e.g. in the National Resident Matching Program [18] . If we add a rule sat ← singles(X), X ≤ (n+p−2k) to the extended induced program P singles ext defined in Subsect. 4.3, then this problem can be formulated as 'does there exist an answer set of the normal ASP program P singles ext which contains the literal sat ?' (i.e. brave reasoning), another NP-complete problem [1] . So our model forms a suitable framework for these kind of decision problems concerning optimality of stable sets in the SMP.
Notice that the complexity of this kind of decision problem and the one mentioned in the last paragraph of Subsect. 3 are a good indication how hard it is to find an (optimal) stable set, as opposed to the problems 'does there exist an (optimal) stable set?', which tell us how hard it is to know whether there exists a solution but not necessarily how hard it is to find one.
Combining these problems leads to a new decision problem: 'is the pair (m, w) optimally stable for an instance of the SMP with unacceptability and ties?'. We define an optimally stable pair as a pair (m, w) for which there exists an optimal stable set in which m and w are matched. As far as we know this problem has not been studied yet, although it could be useful in practice, for instance if one wants to find a maximum cardinality matching but also wants to prioritize some couple or a person. Optimality is still desirable, because it ensures the others from not being put too much at a disadvantage. For instance in the kidney exchange problem, in which kidney patients with a willing but incompatible donor try to interchange each other's donors to get a transplant, this is a realistic situation: if two patients with intercompatible donors urgently need a transplant, they should get priority, but of course we still want to match as many patients to donors as possible. Considering the complexity of the separate decision problems, the combined problem might have a higher complexity, perhaps corresponding to the Σ P 2 -complexity of our grounded disjunctive normal ASP program with aggregate functions [1, 3] . It should be noticed however that the addition of constraints not necessarily increases complexity and a precise classification of complexity is desirable.
Conclusion
We formalized and solved different variants of the SMP using ASP programs, which can easily be adapted to yet other variants. Moreover we applied saturation to compute optimal stable sets, with the advantage that these programs can be handled with the efficient off-the-shelf ASP solver DLV. To the best of our knowledge, our encoding offers the first exact implementation of finding sex-equal, egalitarian, minimum regret, or maximum cardinality stable sets for an instance of the SMP with unacceptability and ties. Hence, our general framework allows us to tackle a class of problems and requires only small adaptions to easily shift between them.
